Linking Progressive Corporate Law with Progressive Social Movements by Testy, Kellye Y.
University of Washington School of Law
UW Law Digital Commons
Articles Faculty Publications
2002
Linking Progressive Corporate Law with
Progressive Social Movements
Kellye Y. Testy
University of Washington School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-articles
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Law and Society Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at UW Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles by an authorized administrator of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kellye Y. Testy, Linking Progressive Corporate Law with Progressive Social Movements, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1227 (2002),
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-articles/328
Linking Progressive Corporate Law with
Progressive Social Movements
Kellye Y Testy
In Linking Progressive Corporate Law with Progressive Social Movements, Professor
Testy cuitically assesses what has been termed a "new" corporate social responsibility project
After noting the hegemony of shareholder primacy in corporate law, she critiques four major
counter-hegemonic discourses: team production theory, corporate social accountabiity,
stakeholder theory, and corporate social responsibility (orprogressive corporate law). Finding
the fist three ineffective foils for the problems of corporate power that have spurred calls for
reform, she turns to an examination of the progressive corporate law project That projec
presentlypoised at a deFiningjunctre as itattempts to use the 'naster§ tools"to "dismantle the
master§ house, "nonetheless holds promise for the 'Piecemeal, but cumulative change" that will
be necessary to assure that corporations enhance human flourishing rather than retard it In
order to realize its progressive potential, Testy suggests that the movement bolster itself through
more explicit attention to the project. nonmative goals, which can andshould open the door to
increasedinfluence through stategic inkages with otherprogressive social movements.
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Itis easy to be a reabst when you accept everything. Itis easy to be a
visionary when you confront nothing To accept little and confront
much, and to do so on the basis of an informed vision ofpiecemeal but
cumulative change, is the way and the solution.'
* Wismer Professor and Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University. I thank
Stephanie Wilson, Colin Folawn, Christopher Wyant, and Nancy Ammons for their assistance
with various aspects of this project, as well as Dean Rudolph Hasl for his generous support.
1. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER & CORNEL WEST, THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN
PROGRESSIVISM: AN INTATIVE FOR POLmcAL AND EcoNOMc REFORM 32 (1998).
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[ T]he hottestplaces in hell are reserved for those who in a period of
moral crisis maintain theirneutai.ty?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Church. The State. The Corporation. What legal and other
structures can assure that power is deployed in the service of individual
and societal flourishing rather than against it? While this question is a
timeless one, it is also timely. Although significant legal and cultural
changes may flow from the recent rash of corporate accounting and
disclosure debacles,3 the immense power of large multinational
corporations has been relatively unconstrained over the past two
decades due to the confluence of many factors. Start with a pervasive
distrust of regulatory solutions to economic problems, together with a
concomitant faith in the righteousness of private ordering. Add to that
the privileged status of financial capital in corporate governance,
which is reinforced by an obsessive focus by corporate managers and
investment communities on short-term share price. All of that,
combined with exponential growth in the transfer of technology and
other products across national borders, have paved the way for
corporations to rival the state, and certainly the church, in institutional
power and influence.
In response to the need to address the perceived illegitimate and
unchecked power of corporations, what has been termed by some a
"new" corporate social responsibility movement is taking shape in the
legal academy.' Under various labels, including "progressive corporate
law," "good governance "'6  "social disclosure,'" and "socio-
2. Remarks of John E Kennedy in Bonn, West Germany (June 24, 1963), in
RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS REQUESTED FROM THE
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 230 (Suzy Platt ed., 1989) (citing Dante).
3. Much of the planning and writing for this conference took place prior to the fall
of Enron and the rash of revelations of corporate accounting improprieties and other
corporate wrongdoing. All major newspapers have been fall of stories recounting both the
wrongdoing, as well as the emerging legislative and other regulatory responses to it. See,
e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller, Corporate Conduct- The President" Bush Signs BillAimed at Fraud
in Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2002, at Al; Kurt Eichenwald, 2 Ex-Officials at
WorldCom Are Charged in Huge Fraucd N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002, at A1; Richard A. Oppel,
Jr. & Kurt Eichenwald, Citigroup Is Linked to a Deal that Let Enron Skit Rules, N.Y TIMES,
Aug. 2,2002, at Al. For a Web site containing continuing updates on the issue of "corporate
scandals," see http://integrationsolutions.westlaw.com/corporatescandals.
4. Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance "Reform" and the New Corporate
SocialResponsibility, 62 U. PrrT. L. REv. 605, 639-46 (2001).
5. See, e.g., PROGREsSrE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
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economics "' a diverse group of legal academics has trained its
attention on problems perceived to be related to corporations' lack of
attention to interests other than short-term maximization of
shareholder profits. Admittedly, attention to corporate social
responsibility is not new in the usual meaning of the word. A
significant corporate social responsibility movement emerged in the
1970s, aimed primarily at imposing upon corporations increased
regulatory constraints,9 commonly federal ones.'" Consciously and
admittedly progressive in orientation, the former social responsibility
movement left little doubt about its goals and values. As the title of
one of that movement's major tomes suggests, the view was that
corporate power was unruly and dangerous and needed "taming" 1
One distinguishing feature of the new corporate social responsibility
movement is that its focus is primarily upon corporation law and
theory. "Instead of regulating the uses to which the tool is put, these
commentators look to redesign the tool itself. . ..,,
In this Essay, I explore the key efforts at redesign presently at
work in the new corporate responsibility movement and suggest that
the project is presently poised at a worrisome juncture. On the one
hand, the efforts at redesign might be quite progressive in that they
seek to use the very tools of corporate law for social change, including
changing the nature of the corporate enterprise. On the other hand, as
Audre Lorde once said, "the master's tools will never dismantle the
master's house:"3 Accordingly, if the redesign efforts accept the values
6. See, e.g., Aii. INST. LAW, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1994); Co,MITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: FINAL REPORT 7
(1998) (Sir Ronald Hampel, Chair).
7. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARv. L. REV. 1197, 1201-03 (1999).
S. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Proposals for Reform of Corporate Boards of
Directors. The Dual Board andBoard Ombudsperson, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 91 (1997);
see also LYNNE L. DALLAS, LAW AND SocIO-EcONOMIcs (forthcoming book).
9. E.g., RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 62-71 (1976);
William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663,696-703 (1974).
10. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporainn: The Desirable
Linits on State Compeion in Corporate Law, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1435, 1499-1507 (1992);
Mary E. Kostel, Note, A Public Choice Perspective on the Debate over Federal Versus State
Corporate Law, 79 VA. L. REv. 2129 (1993); Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Change of Control
Board: Federal Preempton of the Law Governing a Target Directors, 70 MISS. L.J. 35
(2000).
11. NADER ETAL., supra note 9.
12. PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supranote 5, at xiv.
13. AuDRE LORDE, The Mastery Tools Will Never Dismantle the Mastery House, in
SISTER OUTSIDER 110, 112 (1984).
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and goals of the structures they seek to alter, then the new corporate
responsibility movement risks becoming domesticated 4 and failing to
mount a significant challenge to the status quo.
Which shall it be? Has the corporate social responsibility project
mellowed to the point of ineffectiveness in its new incantation? Or,
has the shift to taking on corporations on their own terms signaled a
more confrontational and structural turn, one that deserves the label
"progressive corporate law"? I certainly favor the latter, and thus in
this Essay attempt to identify how the movement might bolster itself to
move more fully in the progressive direction. In Part II, I briefly
discuss the five major approaches to corporate governance extant
today, noting both the hegemony of the shareholder primacy model, as
well as exploring whether any of four key alternative approaches to
corporate law and policy offer potential for displacing or improving
that model. In Part III, I call for more attention to the normative and
strategic goals that a progressive corporate law project ought to
privilege and evaluate whether any of the existing approaches to
corporate governance are likely to serve those goals. In Part I, I then
present an important benefit of more fully articulating those goals-
the potential for strategic linkages with other progressive social
movements. Such interdisciplinary connections can create solidarity,
and in solidarity there is power stemming from both a widened
perspective as well as sheer numbers. Perhaps just the power the
project needs for the "piecemeal, but cumulative change"'" that will be
required to assure that corporations work in the service of social justice
rather than against it.
II. THE REVITALIZED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT
A. The Hegemony ofShareholderPrimacy
Since Berle and Means's classic exposition in the 1930s,"6
discussions of corporate governance and its reform have centered on
solving problems arguably posed by the separation of ownership from
control in the public corporation. Briefly and simply stated, ownership
and control are separated in the modem public corporation because the
14. Ruthann Robson has written a number of interesting works on the process of
domestication, which she defines as the process of internalizing the values of the dominant
culture to such an extent that it becomes "common sense." See, eog., RUTHANN ROBSON,
LESBIAN (OuT)LAW: SURVIVAL UNDERTHE RULE OF LAW 18 (1992).
15. UNGER & WEST, supm note 1, at 32.
16. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (3d ed. 1991) (1932).
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board of directors and the officers it appoints (managers) command
the enterprise. Shareholders, although deemed the owners of the
enterprise, are largely passive investors. Shareholders are passive
because share ownership is widely dispersed, leaving shareholders
unable to overcome collective action and free rider impediments to
effective corporate suffrage. Left without a potent foil, managerial
power is relatively unconstrained. Consequently, corporate governance
rules are frequently justified as an effort to keep management working
in the interest of the corporation that the shareholders own, rather than
in its own self-interest.
Many corporate law commentators have taken the separation of
ownership and control thesis a further step, asserting that it leads to
what is now termed a "shareholder primacy norm? That is, managers'
highest duties are to shareholders and to maximizing their wealth; thus,
shareholders must be preferred in the event that a conflict between
corporate constituents emerges. For instance, the classic example is a
decision over a plant closing. Managers could increase the value of the
corporation's shares if an unproductive plant were closed; at the same
time, such a closing would displace workers and disrupt the
community in which the corporation is situated. Under the
shareholder primacy norm, managers must close the plant to fulfill
their duty to shareholders, despite the harm to workers and other
nonshareholder communities that such a closure would engender.
Although several able commentators have made the case that the
shareholder primacy norm is embodied neither in past or present legal
standards nor in corporate practice,17 most commentators, regardless of
their place along the political spectrum, continue to place this model
on quite a pedestal." Indeed, often the concept of shareholder primacy
was taken for granted to such an extent that its applicability was
presumed, regardless of the particular economy in which the
corporations in question were operating. Some healthy critique is
brewing. For example, Mark Roe recently has suggested that a
shareholder primacy norm fits "less comfortably" with national wealth
maximization where competition is monopolistic or otherwise weak. 9
Perhaps Roe's insights will serve as a wedge to inspire and enable
17. E.g., D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277
(1998); Steven M.H. Wallman, Understanding the Purpose of a Corporation: An
Introduction, 24 J. CoRp. L. 807 (1999).
18. Smith, supm note 17, at 278-79.
19. Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximilzation Norm and Industial
Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 2063, 2066-71 (2001).
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further study on the precise contexts in which shareholder primacy and
societal wealth maximization are aligned, if any."0 Moreover, recent
corporate collapses and fraud disclosures, such as those of Enron,
Worldcom, and others may spur a revision of this norm.' Unless and
until that time, however, shareholder primacy retains its hegemony in
much legal and business commentary on corporate governance. '
B. Counter-Hegemonic Discourses
Like all hegemonic discourse, however, this one too has
generated reaction, rebuttal, and rebellion.' Many commentators have
taken issue with the shareholder primacy and wealth maximization
model, seeking to describe alternative visions of corporate law. While
some of the individual characteristics of these efforts will no doubt be
lost for the sake of simplicity and brevity here, there are presently four
broad categories of reactions and rebellions that can be identified in
the literature on corporate governance. Below I briefly outline each,
taking them in what I consider an increasing order of theoretical
distance from the shareholder primacy norm: (1) the team production
model, (2) corporate accountability, (3) stakeholder theory, and
(4) corporate social responsibility, or progressive corporate law.
1. Team Production Model
A team production theory of corporate law is a relative newcomer
to the field of corporate governance. Drawing upon Alchain and
Demsetz's classic work on economic organization, 4 as well as upon
more recent and innovative attention to power in the firm by Rajan and
20. This more contextual consideration of corporate theory is appropriate given the
wide divergence not only in sizes and types of corporate entities operating within the United
States, but also the wide variety of market situations in which corporations operate in the
global marketplace. A more nuanced, contextual approach is also consistent with the
approach I recommend herein. SeeinfaPartllI.
21. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
22. There are also calls for stepping up the commitment to shareholder primacy. See,
e.g., Robert A.G. Monks, The American Corporaton at the End of the Twentieth Century:
An Outline of Ownershio Based Governance, Speech at Cambridge University(July 1996), at
http://www.lens-library.com/info/cambridge.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2002).
23. In the words of one of the more famous students of power relations, "[d]iscourse
transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it
fragile and makes it possible to thwart it:' I MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SE.XUALnrY
101 (Robert Hurley trans., 1978).
24. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Cos, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972).
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Zingales, Professors Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout have developed
an alternative model of corporate law and theory that they label the
Team Production Model (TPM)."6 As its name implies, TPM
conceptualizes corporate participants-including managers,
shareholders, employees, creditors, and local communities-as a
team.7 The team forms because the members perceive that each will
obtain more from the cooperative endeavor than from individual
action. 8 The resulting team production, however, is nonseparable once
produced 2& -much like a cake that, once stirred and baked, is all the
better for the inability to identify the separate ingredients that went into
its making. Thus, the collective production (or rents)" must be
distributed through some allocative method.
After rejecting several ex ante and ex post possibilities due to
their suboptimal efficiency,3' Blair and Stout adopt Rajan and
Zingales's idea of vesting allocational authority in an independent third
party. Enter the Board of Directors. The board, a "mediating hierarch"
in Blair and Stout's view, if "independent' can allocate rents more
optimally than the other alternatives they earlier rejected.
Accordingly, rather than viewing directors as beholden to shareholders,
TPM sees directors as beholden to the "team." Blair and Stout present
TPM as both a better description of current corporate governance, as
well as a superior normative theory of what corporate governance
should be once unyoked from slavish devotion to shareholder interests.
Taking away the insistence on shareholder primacy, Blair and Stout
25. Raghurain G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Fim, 113 Q.J.
ECON. 387 (1998).
26. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Lan; 85 VA. L. Rv. 247, 265-76 (1999); see also Symposium, Team Production in Business
Organizations, 24 . COR. L. 743 (1999) (reprinting Blair and Stout's article in the Vnginia
LawReviewand including several responsive commentaries).
27. Blair & Stout, supra note 26, at 250,253.
28. See id. at 264-7 1.
29. Id. at 270-72.
30. Id. Blair and Stout are to be commended for attempting to take on economic
reasoning on its own turf, but accordingly, they adopt much of the now familiar economic
terms rather than more "corporate" terms such as "revenue" and "profit."
31. Id at 270-74. Blair and Stout reject ex ante (preset) allocation (for example,
fixed wages) because of the potential for shirking and free riding that such a system permits
when participants believe their return on investment is set, regardless of actual effort
expended. A second alternative, ex post division by the participants themselves, is likely to
engender inefficient squabbling that reduces rents unnecessarily. A final alternative, also
explored, but rejected due to the possibility of opportunistic self-dealing, is vesting
allocational authority in a single team member (such as shareholders or employees). Id. at
270-76.
32. Id. at 270-79.
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leave rent allocation by the board to a "political" process, detached
from substantive guidance on how to cut the cake. As David Millon
has written in a critique of TPM on both descriptive and normative
grounds, allocation becomes "a matter of power rather than
principle."
33
Power? Not principle? Sounds a lot like politics as usual. More
to the point here, it sounds a lot like corporate governance as usual.
Like Millon, I read the TPM theory of corporate governance thus far
articulated as less distant from the shareholder primacy norm than it
claims to be. In a corporate governance model that allocates rents
according to who can strike the best bargain with the board, it is clear
who will end up with the largest slice: the best bargainer. And what
makes one the best bargainer? Power. What kind of power? Usually,
the power to "walk.'
As anyone who has ever bought a car knows, it is the one willing
to walk out of the dealership who gets the best deal. Within the
corporation, the group with the power to walk is much more likely to
be the shareholders. Due to diversified shareholdings in liquid
markets, both individual and institutional shareholders enjoy
substantial exit rights. The ability to "walk," combined with high
unemployment and communities that are eager to compete for
business residency, leave shareholders, far more than employees or
communities, in prime position to bargain most effectively with the
mediating hierarchs. It is no secret that power begets more power.
Indeed, it is one of the most well-taken objections to an increasingly
"contractarian" view of law." When rights are allocated on the basis of
what one can bargain and pay for, those with more resources will
always come out ahead. 6 And they will stay ahead, too.
Still, the new TPM does hold promise. Because it takes on
economic theory on its own terms, it may well penetrate the discourse
of shareholder primacy in ways that the other counter-hegemonic
discourses cannot. Moreover, because TPM does envision the
33. David Millon, New Game Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team
Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REv. 1001, 1004-06, 1026, 1030-37 (2000).
34. Id. at 1023.
35. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Recent Changes to the Model Business
Corporation Act: Death Knells for Main Street Corporaton Law, 72 NEB. L. REv. 258
(1993); Victor Brudney, Contact and FiduciaryDuty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REv 595
(1997); David Millon, Communiaians, Contractanans, andthe Crisis in Corporate Law, 50
WASH. & LEEL. REv. 1373 (1993).
36. E.g., Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A
Citi'que, 33 STAN. L. REv. 387 (1981).
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corporation as a collective enterprise, it holds substantial potential for
recasting the duties the stewards of that enterprise might owe to those
nonshareholder constituents affected by its reach. Finally, it also more
pointedly reveals the allocation of corporate rents as the power-
political power-contest that I think it is.
2. Corporate Social Accountability
Recent calls for increased corporate social accountability have
come from a variety of national and international sources. The
accountability approach to corporate law is essentially one of
disclosure,37 adopting the core animating principle of the federal
securities laws." Make corporations tell the world what they are
doing, and the world will penalize them for bad deeds and reward them
for good deeds, making them "account" for their conduct. The
corporate accountability approach to corporate governance thus avoids
imposing substantive duties on corporations other than one of
enhanced disclosure. Because large public corporations are already
under substantial duties of disclosure under the federal securities
laws, " this does not add a duty as much as it expands the list of items
that are subject to it.
For instance, Cindy Williams has recently argued that the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has the statutory
authority to require, and should require, expanded social disclosure by
publicly reporting companies to promote "corporate social
transparency" akin to the financial transparency that she believes
already exists in U.S. capital markets.0 On the global front, the
Council on Economic Priorities Accreditation Agency recently
promulgated an international social accountability standard, S.A. 8000,
37. Williams, supra note 7.
38. 1 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECuRIEs REGULA'nON 171-80 (3d ed. 1998).
See generally JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 39-40 (2d rev. ed.
1995) (discussing the drafting of the securities acts); James M. Landis, The Legislatve
History of the Secutities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. Rnv. 29, 34 (1959) (relying on his
position as one of the primary authors of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to discuss the purpose of these acts).
39. The duty of disclosure is substantial, and escalating, according to some
commentators. See Joel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual
Approach to the Evolving Structure ofFedeml Securities Regulaton, 93 MICH. L. Ray. 649,
673-702 (1995) (discussing the significant expansion in disclosure obligations in the past two
decades).
40. Williams, supranote 7, at 1201, 1293-96.
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which is designed to be used by independent third parties to audit
companies on labor and other human rights issues."
As Williams concedes, however, the accountability approach to
corporate governance is an indirect one.42 It is also very market
faithfil. Proponents of corporate accountability must necessarily take
highly efficient markets as their starting point. For accountability to
work, the information must make its way to the market in a manner
that allows for its incorporation and dissemination there. Moreover,
market participants must be willing and able to access that information
and to act upon it. It asks corporate managers to "be accountable
simply to disclose to their shareholders the extent of the negative
consequences of their pursuits." 3 Thus, this approach does not limit
managers' power to occasion negative consequences, or punish them
directly for doing so. Rather, it leaves the task of judgment to the
shareholders. "Expanded social disclosure seeks to provide greater
information to shareholders ... so that shareholders can determine the
extent to which they approve of the trade-offs management has made
between economic returns and social and environmental effects."
Power to the shareholders, not principles for the managers. This
is starting to sound familiar. Moreover, in these post-Enron times,
reliance on the soundness of our system of corporate disclosure rings
particularly hollow. Granted, our system of corporate disclosure
should be a sound one, and at present it needs some work to achieve
that baseline goal. Still a disclosure-based regime, standing alone,
does little to alter existing power arrangements.
3. Stakeholder Theory
Stakeholder theory proceeds on the premise that there are a
number of related, but separable, interests in the manner in which a
corporation exercises its power, and that managers should consider all
of those "stakeholder" interests in its decision-making processes, not
just one (such as shareholders). Stakeholder (or other-constituency)
41. CouNCm ON EcoNOMic PRioRriTEs ACCREDrrATION AGENCY (CEPAA), SocIAL
AccouN1xnAITy 8000, available at http://wlxv.cepaaorgI/Standard%20English.doe (last visited
July 3, 2002).
42. Williams, supa note 7, at 1293-96.
43. Id at 1294.
44. Id at 1295.
45. Enron's bankruptcy and the multitude of issues surrounding it regarding
corporate accountability is the subject of much attention in the national media. See e.g.,
Kurt Eichenwald, Enron Paid Huge Bonuses in '01; Experts See a Motive for Cheating, N.Y
TIMES, Mar. 1, 2002, atAl.
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theory was born in the takeover boom of the 1980s, as managers
struggled to find a legitimate reason to "just say no" to an acquirer
offering a substantial share-price premium.46  Although usually
resistant to entreaties to consider nonshareholder interests, managers
seized upon the idea of "other constituents" as a reason to reject a
premium bid and thereby remain in control of their enterprise (and
their jobs). Over thirty states now have legislation permitting
corporate directors to consider interests of other groups, in addition to
shareholders, when making decisions.'7  Only one (Connecticut) of
those statutory schemes, however, makes that broader consideration
mandatory; the rest are merely permissive.4
Not surprisingly, the permissive nature of other-constituency
statutes has limited their effect in corporate decision-making
processes. 9  Outside of the hostile-takeover context, evidence of
directors willingly adding other constituencies into the decision-
making mix under the permissive statutes is nil. ' Similar to TPM,
stakeholder theory risks creating a free-for-all among stakeholders in
the quest for control of the corporate enterprise, a free-for-all in which
the already powerful are likely to continue to prevail. The definitional
and operational difficulties of a stakeholder approach to corporate
governance have been well documented and discussed elsewhere."
Chief among those critiques is that the ambiguity in defining who is
and who is not a "stakeholder" will actually increase the power and
discretion of management, because they will be beholden to no one in
particular.2 At least with shareholder primacy, the argument goes,
managers are clear on whom they should be serving. That clarity, even
if it does no more, at least offers more constraint than an amorphous
responsibility to "stakeholders"
Despite their hypocritical origins, permissive nature, and practical
difficulties, these statutes have nonetheless succeeded in stepping up
discourse around the concept of the corporate stakeholder. This
46. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constiuency Statutes: HollowHopes
and False Fears, 1999 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 85, 92-94.
47. Id. at 94-96.
48. Id. at 101 n.73.
49. See, e.g., id. at 101-02.
50. Id. at 94-96, 100-01.
51. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the
Corporate Objective Function, J. APP. CoRp. FIN., Fall 2001, at 8; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, the
Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. Cn. L. REv. 973, 1021-26 (2002).
See generally Symposium, Corporate Malaise--Stakeholder Statutes: Cause or Cure, 21
STETSON L. REv 3 (1991).
52. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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discourse has found its way into numerous academic and practice-
specific writings and discussions. 3 More importantly, it has made its
way into business school classrooms. There, future managers are
taught that it is good for the corporation to consider all stakeholders
and that such inclusiveness is part of a corporation's best practices.'
Accordingly, taken at the level -of discourse, the stakeholder (or
"communitarian") approach to corporate governance has had
substantial effect and promises to continue to thrive, at least in this
norm-creation and norm-modification sense.5 Indeed, like the TPM
model that makes the corporate rent allocation contest more visibly
political, the stakeholder model holds significant promise for spurring
more complex analysis of power relationships within the corporation.
4. Corporate Social Responsibility
Corporate social responsibility is the most aggressive, and
arguably progressive, of the four counter-accounts of shareholder
primacy and relentless short-term wealth maximization. "Theories of
corporate social responsibility cast a potentially broader net,
emphasizing all of the social costs of corporate activity, and therefore
embrace, for example, environmental or political concerns as well as
stakeholder interests."56  Although within the corporate social
responsibility movement there are surely differences in both the
underlying motivations as well as the recommended changes required
in law and policy, there are also unifying similarities. Most
importantly, concern over the increasing concentration of wealth in
society that the relentless pursuit of shareholder profit has facilitated,
and how the power that wealth creates is deployed, animates the
growing chorus of corporate social responsibility advocates."
While it is safe to say that this movement has been effective at the
level of discourse about corporate law, for the most part it has yet to
claim any significant victories at the level of legal doctrine or public
53. See, e.g., STEVEN F WALKER & JEFFREY WV MARR, STAKEHOLDER POWER: A
WINNING PLAN FOR BUILDING STAKEHOLDER COMMITMENT AND DRVING CORPORATE
GROWTH (2001).
54. Id
55. An argument could be made, of course, that all of these counter-discourses
operate at this level. Thus, even if they are not successful in working out specific regulatory
changes, they do succeed in altering discourse and norms. This "Foucaultian" view of
corporate social responsibility would be a good topic for study and elaboration by one trained
in discourse analysis and theory.
56. Millon, supra note 33, at 1002 n.5.
57. For an excellent collection of corporate social responsibility writings, which
adopt the progressive label, see PROGRESsivE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 5.
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policy." (Of course, with the post-Enron flurry of legislative and other
denouncements of corporate greed, victory may at last be in view.")
Although there is today much talk in business about social
responsibility, most commitments to that idea are increasingly cast in
terms of improving profits rather than improving the societal
conditions that first spurred-the progressive corporate law movement.
Admittedly, those profit-minded approaches also claim that there is a
correlation between what is "good for society" and what is "good for
business profit. ' Were that correlation exact, however, it is unlikely a
progressive corporate law movement would have had the motivation or
need to begin this dialogue in the first place. It is the perception of a
significant divergence between the two that has generated the
movement.
Moreover, business has an enormous capacity for commodification.
There is real concern that corporate social responsibility will become
just another commodity that businesses sell in the service of short-
term shareholder wealth maximization, rather than the basis for any
substantive change in the way business is done.6' What gives one
further pause regarding calls for corporate managers to be more
attuned to social issues is the question of whether such action on
managers part would serve the progressive ends reformers seek.
Corporate managers are not elected officials, nor are they a
particularly diverse or progressive group. Additionally, as noted above,
under the current structure of corporate law managers enjoy virtually
unchecked power and discretion.
Specifically, boards of directors are far from a representative
group, as far as the various corporate constituents are concerned.
Unlike examples abroad, for instance, boards in the United States do
not routinely have representatives from labor.' Moreover, boards are
58. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
60. Many attribute a harsh version of this view to Milton Friedman, although
Friedman contemplates the drive for profit being within both legal and recognized cultural
constraints. See Milton Friedman, A Fiedman Doctrine: The Social Responsibility of
BusinessIs to Increase ItsProfits, N.Y TMEs, Sept. 13, 1970, (Magazine), at 32.
61. See Peter Sinton, Crisis of Conscience, S.E CHRON., Nov. 22,2001, atB1 ("[I]t's
easy to cut back on this stuff")
62. Germany is a particularly good example of a more representative board structure.
See, e.g., Klaus J. Hopt, The German Two-Tiered Board Expeience, Theories, Reforms, in
CONPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH
227, 227-58 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998).
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not diverse." Women generally, and men and women from racial
minority groups, are receiving increasing numbers of invitations to
serve on corporate boards. Still, their numbers are disappointingly
low.
Furthermore, while there has indeed been increased attention to
the independence of boards from officers of the corporation, ' and a
concomitant increase in the number of "outside" directors serving,"
many commentators question how "independenf' these independent
directors really are. For instance, one of the arguably independent
directors in the Enron debacle is Dr. John Mendelsohn, president of the
University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center." No one was
really surprised when it was revealed that Enron had contributed
substantial sums to Dr. Mendelsohn's Center around the time of his
election to the board, as well as having hosted a gala in honor of the
Center and George and Barbara Bush's joint seventy-fifth birthday
party that raised over $10 million for the Center." In sum, if managers
were to take up the mantle of social responsibility in earnest under
present corporate governance structures, progressive reformers might
become sorry they had suggested the idea." Put differently, unless the
corporate social responsibility movement can also succeed in altering
the extant power relationships of corporate law, calls for increased
board attention may yield a less-than-progressive result.
63. See Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STANFORD J. L. Bus &
FIN. 85, 88-89 (2000).
64. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law,
Norms, and the Unintended Consequences oflndependence andAccounmability, 89 GEO. L.J.
797 (2001) (citing a number of sources throughout that concern the independence of boards
from corporate officers).
65. Id.
66. Jo Thomas & Reed Abelson, Howa Top Medical ResearcherBecame Entangled
with Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,2002, at Cl.
67. See id
68. A contrary view, however, might be indicated by the recent study of corporate
philanthropy by the Capital Research Center, which indicates that corporations give "4 times
as much to left-leaning charities and public-policy advocates than to right-leaning ones."
CHRISTOPHER YABLONSKI, PATrERNS OF CORPORATE PIHANTHROPY: A MANDATE FOR
REFORM, at iii (200 1), athttp:/vww.capitalresearch.org/misc/pcpXlll.pdf (last visited July 5,
2002).
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I1. NORMATivEAND SOMEWHERETO Go:69 PROGRESSIVE
CORPORATE LAW
Running through each of the four central restructuring efforts
discussed above is the commonality of discontent with the present
dominant view of corporate law and theory, and arguably the practical
effects of corporate action in sdciety as well. After all, why bother to
mount a critique if all is well? Nonetheless, present legal critiques are
surprisingly reticent about the precise source of that discontent."0 This
Part argues that those who would support a progressive corporate law
project must identify and articulate more fully the normative visions
for society that animate their calls for reform of corporate law and
policy. It is not enough to seek to counter shareholder primacy, for
instance, without being clear about exactly what it is about shareholder
primacy that is troubling and what its reform will accomplish.
Put simply, then, I am encouraging a more explicit account of
what it is that progressive corporate law seeks to accomplish. To do
so, however, requires initial attention to the label of the project.
Although much used, the term "progressive" is rarely defimed in legal
commentary.7 There are ranges of meanings for the word, with much
history behind them, far more than there is time and space to explore
here. 2 Because the term is subject to so much variance in meaning,
however, it is all the more important to attempt to articulate the
normative goals of a progressive corporate law project. While it would
not be wise to define the project's values and goals rigidly, as that
might limit development and growth, neither is it wise to leave it
undefined.73 Without some definitional contours, it is impossible to
69. With apologies to Pierre Schlag. See Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to
Go, 43 STAN. L. Rv. 167 (1990) (discussing the normativity of law).
70. For an exception, see David Millon, Communitarians, Contmctarians, and the
Cisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1373 (1993) (discussing the underlying
normative differences between communitarian and contractarian approaches to corporate
governance).
71. See, e.g., Kelly D. Askin, Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the
Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: Current Status, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 97 (1999); Karla C.
Robertson, Note, Penetrating Sex and Marnage: The Progressive Potential ofAddressing
Bisexuality in Queer Theory, 75 DENv U. L. REv. 1375 (1998); Nancy Ehrenreich, The
Progressive Potentialin Pivatzation, 73 DENv. U. L. REv. 1235, 1249 (1996).
72. See OxToRn ENGLISH DicnoNARY (2d ed. 1989), available at http://wwvv.
oed.comfcgifentry/00189660.
73. For three examples of articles that define progressive within the context of their
particular subject area, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Ven Countryman andthe Path ofProgressive
(andPopulist)BankruptcyScholarsip, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1075, 1077 (2000) (using abroad
definition similar to the use of the term herein); Thomas M. Franck & Mohamed ElBaradei,
The Coafication and Progressive Development of Internatonal Law: A UNiTAR Study of
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say whether reform proposals further the project or retard it. There is,
of course, some risk that in efforts to be more explicit about values and
goals, divisions within the new corporate social responsibility
movement may become apparent, or at least more apparent. That risk
is one worth taking. Internal critique is healthy.74
A good place to start in thinking about what a progressive
corporate law might look like is common meanings of the word
"progressive." One common definition is "favoring, advocating, or
directing one's efforts toward progress or reform, especially in
political, municipal, or social matters." 5 Of course, that still does not
say very much about the kind of reform being sought. In beginning to
answer this question, Professor Eric Yamamoto's description of the
meaning of "progressive" in his outstanding work on racial oppression
provides guidance.76 Yamamoto characterizes a progressive project as
an "interconnecting project that seeks to eliminate all forms of
subordination, including subordination based on gender, class,
religion, national origin, sexual orientation, and disability."7
the Role and Use of the Internadonal Law Commission, 76 AM. J. INT'LL. 630, 631 (1982)
(defining the progressive development of draft conventions); Theresa M. Beiner & John M.
A. DiPippa, Hostile Environments and the Religious Employee, 19 U ARK. LrrTLE ROCK L.J.
577, 629 n.350 (1997) (defining progressive in the context of religion).
74. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Beyondthe Rhetoric of"DirtyLaundry" Examining
the Value of Internal Crticism Within Progressive Social Movements and Oppressed
Communies, 5 MICH. J. RAcE& L. 185 (1999).
75. See OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 72. The commentary following
this definition indicates:
Used from cl 889 as a party term in municipal politics, esp. in London, to include
those who were liberal or reforming in municipal and social questions, though they
might not support the Liberal party in national or imperial questions. In South
Africa the self-adopted appellation of those who opposed the Bond or Africander
party, corresponding orig. to the British party as opposed to the Dutch. More
recently in South Africa, designating several political parties committed to a policy
of multi-racialism; also, freq. a name or term adopted by radical, left-wing, or
communist parties.
Id
76. Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praris: Race Theory and Politcal Lawfyering
Practice in Post-Civil R'ghtsAmeica, 95 MIcHL. REv 821 (1997).
77. Id at 831 n.36. For similar approaches, see generally MARl J. MATSuDA, WHERE
IsYOuR BODY? (1996)(focusing on the Asian perspective of the feminist movement); GERALD
P. LOpEz, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHRCANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACrICE
(1992) (exploring the struggles of underappreciated progressive legal programs);
Symposium, Theoretcs ofPracce: The Integration ofProgressive Thought andAction, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1992) (considering subordination in several areas of law); Francisco
Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex."
"Gender,"and "Sexual Orientation"in Euro-American Law and Socie(y, 83 CAL. L. REV. I
(1995) (describing the difference and interconnection among categories of subordination).
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This guidance can help to identify what it is about corporations
that might further progressive causes, and what it is that is troubling
for those interests. In this vein, it is particularly important to
acknowledge that corporate power, like most forms of power, is not
one sided. Corporations are not inherently oppressive. Indeed,
corporations may be better. situated than other institutions in
addressing some social concerns. Christopher Stone made this point
back in 1975,'  although few commentators have given it the
considered attention it deserves." The good news is that this kind of
attention seems to be forthcoming. Today's corporate social
responsibility advocates appear to understand that corporate power,
too, has many faces,"0 as demonstrated by the willingness of these
writers to attempt to work with the master's tools as well as to design
other tools as well. Moreover, an increasing number of scholars
outside the corporate law area are recognizing the potential benefit of
private, as opposed to public, solutions to socio-legal problems. 2
What, then, would be progressive uses of corporate power? What
would be oppressive uses of corporate power? In other words, what is
the normative agenda of the progressive corporate law project and is
the revitalized corporate social responsibility movement furthering it?
While articulating the normative agenda of the project should be a
dialogic process, at this point I will sketch several core components
that should be included.
78. CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF
CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 74-118 (1975).
79. For a very recent exception, see Kent Greenfield, From Metaphor to Reality in
Corporate Law, 2 STAN. AGORA 59 (2001), at http://lawschool.stanford.edu/agora/
cgi-bin/article2_corp.cgi?library=greenfield (last visited July 5, 2002).
80. See JuDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATrER: ON THE DIscuRSvE LIm1TS OF "SEX"
(1993); JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY
(1990); MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER
WRITINGS 1972-1977 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980); STEVEN LUKES,
POWER: A RADICAL VIEW (1974); PROVOKING AGENTS: GENDER AND AGENCY IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE (Judith Kegan Gardiner ed., 1995).
81. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
82. See Ehrenreich, supra note 71 (containing a good general discussion of trend);
Martha M. Ertman, Contractual Purgatory for Sexual Marginoities: Not Heaven, But Not
Hell Either, 73 DEN. U. L. REv 1107 (1996) (using contract law in support of the gay rights
movement); Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the PrivatePrivate
Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79 (2001) (suggesting business models for intimate
relationships); Kellye Y. Testy, An Unlikely Resurrecdon, 90 Nv. U. L. REv. 219 (1995)
(using contract law for progressive ends); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes:
Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Ri'ghts, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401, 408
(1987) (discussing empowerment via concepts others might characterize as oppressive).
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First, progressive corporate law and policy should seek an
increased dispersion of wealth in society, rather than an increased
concentration of wealth. Gaps between the rich and poor are
becoming deeper, and the role of corporate power in this systemic
problem should be interrogated. Second, following Yamamoto's lead, a
progressive corporate law project should also seek measures that
reduce all forms of subordination and discrimination, including that
based upon race, gender (including both gender identity and sexual
orientation), age, physical disability, and religious identity. While
discrimination concerns are often primarily employee-focused, they
also should extend to customers, suppliers, and others with whom the
corporation interacts. Third, a progressive corporate law project
should be consistent with environmental justice movements. This area
has begun to receive frequent mention in discussions regarding the
troubling effects of corporate power and the law's failure to constrain
corporate externalities." Fourth, a progressive corporate law project
should seek to enhance social democracy, not subvert it. While the
question of whether corporations might be better suited to address
particular social ills than is the state is still an open one, a progressive
corporate law project should interrogate those practices, such as
corporate campaign spending and lobbying, that allow corporate
power to interfere with and retard democratic governance.'
Under these four broad points, do any of the existing approaches
to corporate law and policy constitute progressive approaches? First of
all, it must be noted that under present corporate law structures and
public policy configurations, there is cause for concern along each of
the four axes. Wealth concentration is increasing at alarming levels.
Racial, gendered, and other forms of subordination, while lessened to
some degrees, remain destructive structural problems." Despite
increased attention to the "greening" of society, continuing
environmental degradation is well documented. 6 Finally, few seriously
contend that our government today is "by the people" or "for the
83. See, e.g., Lauren A. Mowery, Earth Rights, Human Rights: Can International
Environmental Human Rights Affect Corporate Accountabihtpy? 13 FORDHAM ENVIL. L.J.
343 (2002); Carmen G. Gonzalez, Instituonalizing Inequality: The WTO Agreement on
Agriculture, Food Secuwity and Developing Countries, 27 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 433 (2002).
See generally Symposium, Trade, Sustainability and Global Governance, 27 COLUNM. J.
ENVTL. L. (2002).
84. For particularly vigorous writing on this score, see DEFYING CORPORATIONS,
DEFINING DEMOCRACY: A BOOK OF HISTORYAND STRATEGY (Dean Ritz ed., 2001).
85. For an excellent reader on this subject, see RCHARD DELGADO & JEAN
STEFANCIC, CRmCALRACETHEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (2001).
86. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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people"--but for the convenient definition of a corporation as a legal
person. 7 Thus, any defense of existing structure is unlikely to qualify
as progressive unless, of course, no revised institutional structures can
be conceived of or implemented that can achieve more of the
normative goals identified above.
Do any of the reformist approaches to corporate governance
exhibit progressivism? As discussed above, at present there are
significant obstacles to considering some of these approaches to
corporate law as likely to reduce wealth accumulation, subordination,
environmental degradation, or democratic obstacles. Both the team
production model and the stakeholder model fall short in that (as
presently constituted) they are apt to result in a power struggle among
the various constituents for corporate rents, and thus are likely to
reinforce existing power relations rather than alter them."3 Both
approaches also threaten to increase managerial discretion to the point
that managers become less accountable under these models than they
are at present under the shareholder primacy model."
The corporate accountability project, to the extent it asks no more
than disclosure, does nothing to alter existing structural inequities. It
takes on faith that the disclosure requirements will succeed in getting
pertinent information out to constituents about corporate social
activities, and that those constituents will act on that information to
reward good corporate social conduct and penalize bad social conduct.
While there is some evidence that increased attention to notions of
corporate social responsibility has succeeded in generating attention to
these issues, the number of persons (and dollar volumes) acting on
such information is still comparatively small."
Of course, the other potential benefit of disclosure is that
corporations may be reluctant to disclose negative social conduct, so
they may refrain from engaging in it for fear of having to talk about it.
Perhaps. Such a behavioral-modification effect would depend on
whether managers perceive that they will be penalized for the
disclosure, which seems relatively unlikely given free-rider problems
inherent in policies that benefit society at large. Only if disclosure
convinces investors not to become shareholders, workers not to
become employees, and communities not to become hosts will it have
the requisite effect. Moreover, this theory depends on a strong
87. Monks, supra note 22.
88. See supra notes 23-34, 45-49 and accompanying text.
89. See id.
90. SeeWilliams, supra note 7, at 1293.
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presumption that all of those groups have a choice; I believe there are
clear and significant differences among and between those constituents
on this axis, depending upon the competitiveness of the particular
market.' Finally, significant concerns remain as to whether even
required disclosures reach those groups in a manner in which they can
be understood.
The corporate social responsibility project, including what has
heretofore been identified as progressive corporate law (sometimes
also described as a socio-economic approach to corporate law),
appears to fall closest to the goals and values that I have recommended
here. Examples of particularly encouraging directions and proposals
have come from a number of writers and from a number of directions.
Importantly, these writers take multidirectional tacks to changing the
relationship between corporations and society, at various times seeking
to alter the understandings of present corporate law, to implement
changes in structures and doctrines, and to argue for new regulations
of activities. For instance, Kent Greenfield cogently argues that the
ultra vires doctrine has been read too restrictively and that "dedication
to lawfulness is an inherent aspect of corporate governance, and that
corporate law offers a way to enforce such dedication:'92  Steven
Ramirez makes a strong case that corporate law structures should both
permit and encourage increased diversity.93 Marleen O'Connor has
insightfully and forcefully argued for increased protection of workers'
rights through altered board structures.' Larry Mitchell has generated
a remarkable body of work on corporate social responsibility that
argues for revisions in our understandings of basic corporate law
concepts and suggests structural reforms both within and without
corporate law." Lynne Dallas has articulated a "power coalition"
theory of the corporation that takes account of the power relationships
91. See id at 1296 (recognizing that increased disclosure is not a "panacea").
92. Kent Greenfield, U/!ta Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate
fliegality (With Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms),
87 VA. L. REv. 1279, 1283 n.6 (2001).
93. SeeRamirez, supra note 63.
94. E.g., Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing
Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. R v. 899
(1993).
95. In addition to the progressive corporate law volume that he edited (and that now
sadly, is out of print), Mitchell has an impressive collection of work directed at corporate
social responsibility, all of which is progressive in the sense I advocate here. See, e.g.,
LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRREPONSmmrrY (2001); Transcript, Corporate
Citizenship: A Conversation Among the Law, Business andAcademi, 84 MARQ. L. REV.
723,725-30,74749 (2001) (providing comments of Lawrence E. Mitchell).
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in corporate governance in ways in which the team production and
stakeholder models fall short." Finally, many of the authors in this
Symposium have now added valuable contributions to this emerging
genre of work. 7
Moreover, some progressive possibilities come from what might
be surprising sources. For instance, a promising line of inquiry from
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman regarding the role of
organization law is emerging. Hansmann and Kraakman view the role
of organizational law as providing "for the creation of a pattern of
creditors' rights-a form of 'asset partitioning'-that could not
practicably be established otherwise 9" They argue, however, that the
function of limited liability is not so much the usual story of the
necessity of protecting shareholder personal wealth from the reach of
creditors in order to encourage investment in enterprises, but rather is
"the shielding of the assets of the entity from claims of the creditors of
the entity's owners or managers.'99 While it is possible to read this
analysis as a defense of existing corporate laws, it can also be read
more progressively as opening the door for a more nuanced
consideration of one of the more troublesome aspects of corporate law.
That is, limited liability may be seen as an appropriate shield to protect
the corporate enterprise and its many constituents over the claims of
any one interest. In arguments for changes in corporate law, then, it
may be possible for the progressive aspects of limited liability to be
preserved, while revising the aspects that raise concern.
IV LINKAGES WITH OTHER PROGRESSIVE SocIAL MOVEMENTS
While there are many strong components of a progressive
corporate law movement, it is clearly still a minority voice in the legal
academy. How might that voice be strengthened? First and foremost,
by forging alliances with other progressive social movements, both
within law and outside of it. Because of the complexity and the
interdisciplinary nature of the problems that progressive corporate law
seeks to address, a perspective that takes account of more than just law
is necessary. That is, the most promising way for progressive
96. Lynne L. Dallas, Working Toward a New Pamdgm, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE
LAW, supra note 5, at 35.
97. Symposium, Socio-Economics and Corporate Law: The New Corporate Social
Responsibility, 76 TuL. L. REv 1187 (2002).
98. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizatibnal
Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000).
99. Id.
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corporate law to achieve its aims is for it to link with other progressive
social movements. There are many social movements that seek to
engage issues similar to that of progressive corporate law scholars, but
there has been surprisingly little crossover work between the two. At
this juncture, it is vital that a dialogue begin.
One of the core benefits of more fully articulating the normative
visions of a progressive corporate law project, as I earlier suggested
should be done, is the potential for linkages and coalitions with other
progressive social movements. While it is surely true that the ranks of
corporate law scholars have not been the first to overlap with scholars
in activist movements, that state of affairs is changing today and is
likely to continue to do so. It is becoming less unusual for one to work
in corporate law as well as in, say, feminist theory or critical race
theory. In the past, these areas of legal inquiry barely knew the other
existed, or if they did, made every effort to avoid one another. Today,
however, connections are being forged for a variety of reasons.
First the field of corporate law teachers looks much different
today than it has in the past. More white women and more women and
men of color are in the ranks of corporate law teachers and scholars
today. While I certainly am not arguing that, for instance, one's mere
status as a woman leads to an interest in or support of a feminist
approach to law," the increase in women corporate law faculty has
made it more likely that some of those faculty will view law from the
feminist standpoint. So, too, with critical race theory, gay and lesbian
legal theory, and related antisubordinationist projects.
Furthermore, many newer law teachers graduated from law
school in the mid-1980s to mid-1990s. That time period witnessed
one of the high points of the law and economics movement, as well as
increased attention to corporate and economic matters in general, due
in large part to the takeover boom of the late 1980s. Speaking
generally, of course, many of today's legal scholars are students of the
Reagan and Bush eras, likely more familiar, for example, with Warren
Buffett than with Jimmy. For this group, markets and corporations are
"us'" not "them' For this group, markets work, and governments do
not. For this group, capitalism is the only game in town, and it is in
every town. For this group, "Vietnam" might first mean a good
example of an emerging market, not a terrible example of a U.S.
100. Identity is political, not essential. That is, the particular physical characteristics of
an individual do not necessarily correlate, nor need they, with that individual's intellectual and
political commitments. For an insightful elaboration of this point, see Symposium, Towardsa
Rad'calandPlu-1Democmcy, 33 CAL. W. L. REv. 139 (1997).
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military intervention. For this group, power is not all bad, maybe not
even half-bad. Thus, for those legal and other scholars who work
within progressive movements, it is similarly not as intimidating or
unusual as it used to be to include commercial and corporate concerns
in the field of study.'"' Indeed, those interests are increasingly being
explored as sites of liberation, not just oppression."2
Accordingly, just as more corporate legal scholars are
comfortable, even eager, to discuss issues of race, gender, class, and
sexuality, more critical legal scholars are comfortable, even eager, to
discuss issues of efficient markets, corporate structure, global
capitalism, and economics. With this cross-fertilization comes both
opportunity and risk for progressive projects. The risk is that what
might once have been edgy, oppositional, take-no-prisoners projects
will become tempered to the point of ineffectuality through a
domestication process. For some, it is oxymoronic to claim to be a
feminist economist, or more to the point here, a "progressive"
corporate law scholar. One must necessarily swallow the other, the
worry goes, and with power working the way it does, it is likely to be
the economist or corporate part of the equation that comes out ahead.
While this risk cannot be dismissed out of hand, it can be guarded
against through a thoughtful articulation of normative goals and values
and considered attention to them both aspirationally and strategically.
When progressive corporate law's core normative goals and
values are identified and articulated, it then becomes possible to link
with other progressive social movements that share similar goals and
values. There are many exciting possibilities for linkage and
collaboration (in no particular order): feminism,' 3 critical race
theory,"° environmental justice,' human rights, 6 Catholic social
101. Increased attention to "law and society" and "socio-economics," as well as
increased attention generally to interdisciplinary courses of study have likewise affected this
calculus.
102. See, e.g., David M. Skover & KellyeY. Testy, Lesbigay Identiy as Commodity,
90 CAL. L. Rrv. 223 (2002); see also COMMODPICAnTON FuTurUs (Martha Ertman et al. eds.,
forthcoming 2003).
103. See, e.g., MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCrION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY
(1999); CATHARINEA. MACKINNON, FEMNSM UNMODMD: DIscouRsEs ON LIFE AND LAW
(1987); Robin L. West, The Difference in Womens Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological
Crtique ofFemi'stLegal Theory, 15 Wis. WOMEN's L.J. 149 (2000).
104. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Racism: A Major Source of Property and Wealth
Inequality in America, 34 IND. L. RPv. 1261 (2001); Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of
Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspecve, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221 (1999); Charles R.
Lawrence III, Race, Mulicuituralism, and the Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47 STAN. L.
REv. 819 (1995); Charles R. Lawrence HI, The Id the Ego, andEqual Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987); Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views
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thought,"7 liberation theology,'8  citizen action,'°  queer theory,"'
corporate ethics,"' radical and plural democracy,' and global
responsibility.' 3 This list is just representative, there are surely
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others, "4 and the work of exploring that potential as well as forging
those linkages should be a key component of the progressive corporate
law project in the years ahead. What is striking as one looks at the list
of possibilities is just how divergent in political orientation many of
these groups are. The willingness to explore the common ground
among them may portend our most progressive moment yet.
V CONCLUSION
The project of grappling with corporate power is a vexing one. It,
like all institutional power is both enabling and constraining. The
corporate form has enabled individual talent to be collectivized to
make the whole worth more than the sum of its parts. While the
genius and drive of the resulting entity has improved the living
standards of countless persons, it also has harmed many others. The
emergent pattern of winners and losers is all too familiar and too clear.
Because society is plagued by systemic subordination that prevents
equality of opportunities, a market system, including a system of
corporate governance, that awards rights only to those who can bargain
and pay for them themselves deepens the divisions between the haves
and the have-nots in society. This is not necessarily the nature of
corporations, nor is it the nature of markets. And this Essay is not an
argument for the abandonment of either. It is instead an argument that
the "new" corporate social responsibility can ill afford a singular focus
on either imposing regulations from outside the corporation, or
revising governance structures within, but must instead address both
and more in a complex, interdisciplinary approach.
Further, "unabashed linkages" with other progressive social
movements would further that more complex approach to corporations
and society."5 These linkages will allow the new corporate social
responsibility to engage its progressive dimensions and potentially
improve the relationship between corporations and the society in
which they are situated. Indeed, these linkages are vital if progressive
corporate law is to attain its progressive potential. Milton Friedman
once famously asserted that corporate social responsibility is a
114. For a particularly provocative work, see THOMAS FRANK, ONE MARKET UNDER
GOD: EXTREME CAPITAuSM, MARKET POPuLIsM, AND THE END OF ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY
(2000). Frank is also the founding editor of The.Baffler, a magazine of cultural criticism.
115. For an excellent discussion of the importance of linking law reform movements
with social movements generally, published after this Essay was submitted, see Edward L.
Rubin, Passing Through the Door Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarsip, 150
U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2001).
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"fundamentally subversive doctrine" 1" 6  Ironically, progressive
corporate law's task is to make certain that he is right.
116. Friedman, supra note 60, at 32.
1252 [Vol. 76:1227
